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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
PARENT AND CHILD--COLLEGE EDUCATION-NECESSARIES-The facts of
this case are few, and may be stated briefly. Appellant was divorced hus-
band asking for relief from making further payments towards support of
his minor son in the custody of the appellee, his former wife. Said son was
seventeen years of age, just ready for and desirous of entering college.
Appellant under the divorce decree was bound to pay $9,500 as alimony in
$100 monthly installments, and $50 monthly for the support of the child.
He alleged in his petition that he had remarried, that his family now con-
sisted of his wife and her two minor children by a former marriage, and
that his present and sole income as a coal dealer was only from $3,000 to
$3,500 annually, said sum being insufficient to enable continuance of such
payments. Appellee in a special answer set up declaration that fifty dollars
a month was necessary to meet expenses incident to the son's attending
college. This appeal was prosecuted from a judgment denying the petifion.
Held, Judgment reversed, new trial granted. Morris v. Morris, Appellate
Court of Indiana, May 16, 1930, 171 N. E. 386.
The obvious question of the case is "can a general college edication be
included as a necessary?" It is well established that the duty of a father
to provide for zC minor child in the custody of another is restricted to
"necessaries." Esteb v. Esteb, 138 Wash. 174; 244 Pac. 264. Schouler, in
his classification of common law duties, places the duty to educate second
only to the parent's duty to protect his child, and adds that this education
should be consistent with the station in life of the parties. Blackstone pro-
nounced it by far the greatest duty of all in importance. Schouler, Domes-
tic Relations, v. 1, par. 774.
But the common law failed to make provision for enforcing the moral
or legal obligation of the parent to maintain and educate. The parental
duty to give children an education suitable to their station in life was not
compulsory at common law. School Board District v. Thompson, 24 Okla.
1; 103 Pac. 578. It was presumed that affection implanted by Providenge
was more effective than law. But the omissions of the common law have
been covered by statutory enactments and a development of the theory of an
implied contract to provide, resting on an implied authorization to the one
furnishing such provisions. Today it is an undisputed question that edu-
cation, speaking generally is a necessary. McLean v. Jackson, 123 Ga. A.
51; 76 S. E. 792; Cory v. Cook, 24 R. I. 421; Middlebury College v. Chand-
ler, 16 Vt. 683; 42 Am. Dec. 537; 14 R. C. L. 258.
But the difficulty arises in determining what degree of education shall
be included in the category of necessaries. Whether an article is a neces-
sary is a question of law for the court, but whether a particular class,
quantity, quality, or degree of said necessaries is suitable to the condition
and the estate of the infant is for the determination of the jury. Garr v.
Haskett, 86 Ind. 373; Henderson v. Fox, 5 Ind. 489.
The earliest leading case on this point held that a classical or a gen-
eral college education was not to be included as a necessary. Middlebury
College v. Chandler, supra.
In Peacock v. Linton, 22 R. I. 328, 47 Atl. 887, a father was held not
liable for services rendered in tutoring his son at fifty cents per hour dur-
ing vacation in preparation for college. A later case states that circum-
stances may exist where even general college education and professional
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courses might properly be found to be necessaries. Int. Text Book Co. V.
Connelly, (1912) 206 N. Y. 188; 99 N. E. 722. In that case it was also
judicially suggested that such might be allowed in a case where the infant's
ability and prospects justified it. Thus the earlier cases seem to have con-
fined themselves to elementary or vocational education, and even in the
later cases a college, university or professional education has generally
been excluded. 14 R. C. L. 258.
A recent case, however, held a college education to be a necessary in
view of the following attending circumstances. The child desiring a college
education had a special aptitude in her studies as evidenced by the fact
that she was by special permission allowed to study Greek in her first
year of high school. She was desirous of majoring in English with inten-
tion of teaching. The father had securities valued at $9,000 to $11,000 and
a yearly income of some $3,000. The child had no other means of support.
The court readily held her college education to be a necessary. Esteb v.
Esteb, supra.
From the cases it is found that the following major elements are con-
sidered in determining what kind of education is necessary: (1) infant's
position in life and station in society, (2) fortune of the child and of its
parent, (3) adaptability of the child, and (4) the demand of the times. In
the principal case no stress is laid upon the first element by the appellee.
The fortune of the parent is obviously limited as shown by appellant's
petition, which was competently supported by evidence.
The importance of t is element of fortune of parent or child may be
stressed by reference to cases involving credits on a guardian's account for
maintainance and education of his ward.- These cases are likewise silent
as to what degree of education should be allowed, but they make qualify-
ing statements to the effect that said maintainance and education must be
reasonable in view of the ward's means, prospects, and capacity. Alex-
andcr v. Hillebrand, 140 Mich. 490, 103 N. W. 849; Houseal and Patterson
v. Gibbes, 1 Bailey's Equity (S. Ca.), 23 Am. Dec. 186. In this country a
guardian is usually permitted to incur such expenses at least to the extent
of the income of the estate even without any special court order. Some
courts go so far as to allow without order expenditures out of the principal
if such are reasonable and proper, and such as the court would have or-
dered if applied to. Preble v. Longfellow, 48 Me. 279; Pfefferle v. Herr,
75 N. J. Eq. 219; Hobbs v. Harlan, 10 Lea 126 (Tenn.) 43 Am. Rep. 309.
Unquestionably if the income of an estate were more than adequate to
provide a college education of any kind, the courts would not interfere with
such expenditure.
The adaptability of the child is not stressed by appellee. The fourth
element might form basis of argument against the holding of the prin-
cipal case. In Breed v. Judd, (1 Gray (Mass.) 455) the court said that the
word "necessaries" was flexible and "not an absolute term, having relation
to the infant's condition in life, to the habits and pursuits of the place in
which and the people among whom he lives, and to the changes in those
habits and pursuits occurring in the progress of society." Clearly demands
are different today from those of 1844 when Middlebury College V. Chand-
ler, supra, was decided. Then a college education was the exception, now
it is the rule. But in view of all elements to be considered and the weight
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of authority, the court might properly hold that a general college education
is not yet accepted as a necessary. P. J. D.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-AUTHORITY-CREATION OF RELATIONSHIP-
Samuel E. Skaggs, a bailer of, and dealer in straw, sold most but not all of
the straw he handled to the appellant company at Terre Haute. He pro-
cured straw from the appellee, Charles E. Kennedy, and shipped it to the
appellant company under an agreement with Kennedli that Skaggs should
pay him whatever amount, less $2.00 per car, the appellant paid Skaggs.
For about a month this agreement between Skaggs and Kennedy was kept;
then, after the appellant had reduced its price to Skaggs from $6.25 to
$6.00 per ton, Skaggs represented to Kennedy that the appellant was pay-
ing only $5.50 per ton for straw; and Kennedy did not learn the true price
being paid until almost a year later. He sued for the accumulated difference
between the represented and the true price, and alleged that Skaggs was
the agent of the appellant company-which allegation would, if true, make
appellant liable for the unpaid amount. Evidence showed that Skaggs sold
straw to other strawboard manufacturers, that he was not bound by any
contract to sell to the appellant all the straw he purchased, that Kennedy
had never received a check from appellant company, and that he did not
claim to have a contract with the company, other than his agreement with
Skaggs. Held, Skaggs was an independent buyer and not an agent of the
appellant. Aside from the evidence stated, no reasons were given for the
decision. Judgment against appellant, Terre Haute Paper Company, was
reversed. Terre Haute Paper Company v. Kennedy, Appellate Court, June
23, 1930, 171 N. E. 881.
"An agency is created-authority to act is actually conferred-very
much as a contract is made, i. e. by an agreement between principal and
agent that such a relation shall exist. The minds of the parties must "meet"
in establishing the agency. The principal must intend that the agent shall
act for him, and the agent must intend to accept the authority and act on
it, and the intention of the parties must find expression either in words or
in conduct between them." Taft, J. in Central Trust Co. v. Bridges, 57 Fed.
753. Appointment of an agent may be effected by contract whereby a prin-
cipal promises to employ and compensate the agent, and the agent prom-
ises to act as such; or it may be effected by mere request or permission of
the principal, following by the agent's entrance upon performance of the
act requested. But if no contract is made, and if only a permission or a
request is followed, the relation of principal and agent does not arise until
the agent has entered upon performance. Powell's Tiffany on Agency (2nd
ed.) p. 10. A merely gratuitous offer to perform services for another im-
poses no legal obligation until performance is undertaken. Conden v. Ex-
ton-Hall Agency, 142 N. Y. S. 548.
"Authority to act as agent in any given manner will be implied when-
ever the conduct of the principal is such as to manifest his intention to
confer it." Powell's Tiffany on Agency, p. 23. "No one can become the agent
of another person except by the will of that other person. His will may
be manifested in writing or orally, or simply by placing another in a situ-
ation in which, according to the ordinary rules of law, or perhaps it would
be better to say according to the ordinary usages of mankind, that other
